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It is widely accepted in economics literature that ethnically contested
societies are prone to political instability, which in turn is an established
impediment to economic growth and development.' Many developing
countries have begun to recognize the importance of a properly functioning
legal framework for economic development. Legal responses to ethnic
discrimination or other forms of social differentiation come mostly in the
form of antidiscrimination laws. As many developing countries invest in
stronger legal frameworks, antidiscrimination laws have become a perva-
sive tool in efforts to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities in the labor mar-
ket and in society in general.
Antidiscrimination laws are designed to correct labor market distor-
tions on the basis of somewhat settled distinctions such as race, gender,
age, and sexual orientation.2 However, in many developing countries where
the basis of discrimination is primarily based on ethnic orientation, under-
standing its various manifestations is critical to proposing laws that can
effectively ameliorate ethnic bias in society and promote economic growth
and development. Most empirical studies that have examined the link be-
* Visiting Associate Professor Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota-
Twin Cities, 1994 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108. 1 would like to thank Ruth Okediji and Aleatra
Williams for useful comments. I also benefited from comments by participants at the Symposium on
Law and Economic Development in Latin America: A Comparative Approach to Legal Reform, hosted
by the Chicago-Kent College of Law, April 13-14, 2007. Excellent research assistance was provided by
Tomas Felcman.
1. See Anthony Annett, Social Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Govern-
ment, 48 IMF STAFF PAPERS 561 (2001); Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Democracy, 107 J. POL.
ECON. S158, S 158-60 (1999); Paul Collier, Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance, 12 ECON. &
POL. 225 (2000); William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic
Divisions, 112 Q. J. EcON. 1203 (1997); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681,
683 (1995).
2. For more, see William J. Collins, The Labor Market Impact of State-Level Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 1940-1960, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 244, 244-45 (2003); John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
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tween ethnicity and growth have relied on the Ethno-linguistic Fractional-
ization Index (ELF).3 1 have discussed elsewhere the limits of ELF, primar-
ily its undue reliance on language as a measure of ethnic fractionalization.
4
I proposed a more robust measure, called the Social Diversity Index (SDI)
that more fully captures the complexity of ethnicity. 5 In this article, I exam-
ine the application of SDI in a legal context where antidiscrimination laws
have been enacted to ameliorate the destabilizing effects of fractionaliza-
tion. Using Brazil as a case study, I suggest ways in which legal remedies
may be more effectively designed to contain effects of heterogeneity, espe-
cially its impact on economic growth potential.
There are a number of reasons for choosing Brazil in this study. Be-
sides having the largest economy and being the most populous country in
Latin America, Brazil has a unique history of cultural and racial migration,
which has created a racially diverse society. Despite this racial diversity,
marked inequalities continue to prevail along racial lines, especially in
education, as well as in the labor market and other sectors of the economy.
3. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index was constructed by Charles L. Taylor and Michael
C. Hudson in 1972, based on the data contained in SOLOMON BRUK, V. ALENCENKO & VLADIMIR G.
TELBERG, ATLAS NARODOV MIRA (1964). CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON, WORLD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (2d ed. 1972). This data was compiled by Soviet
social scientists in 1960 in an attempt to determine the number of ethno-linguistic groups in the world
population on a per country basis. The ELF Index is defined as:
E F I ni] : ......... I
ELF,=- ,N '
where ni is the number of people in the ith group, N is the population, and I is the number of ethno-
linguistic groups in the country. ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals
belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. The values range from 0 to 1, 0 representing no fractional-
ization (or perfect homogeneity), and I representing the highest level of heterogeneity. For more on the
ELF values, see Appendix A, infra, at 195.
4. For an extensive critique of ELF and a discussion of the inherent bias of using language as a
main determinant of ethnic diversity, see Tade 0. Okediji, The Dynamics of Ethnic Fragmentation: A
Proposal for an Expanded Measurement Index, 64 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 637, 652, 655 (2005).
5. The SDI is a weighted index of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation. It is defined
as:
E EI=I, S nyk ]2 i= 1 ........ s, j =1 .......... R, and k = I ...... L,
SDI 1 - Y R
i=1 j=1 k=1 N v
where n represents the number of people in the ith andjth and kth groups, N is the population, and L, R,
and S are, respectively, the number of linguistic, racial and religious groups in the country. The primary
source of data for the SDI is 2 DAVID B. BARRETT, GERORGE T. KURIAN & TODD M. JOHNSON, WORLD
CHRISTIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (2d ed. 2001). Secondary sources include U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1999) and CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON,
WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (2d ed. 1972). The SDI represents the first
attempt to capture the multiple and overlapping features of ethnic expression in a single index, and in
effect, to offer a measure of social fragmentation. The SDI was computed for 132 countries. For more,
see Appendix B, infra, at 197.
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Brazil has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world.6 This
complex relationship between social identity and the economic perform-
ance of Brazil continues to generate research initiatives and is the focus of
this paper.
In Part I of this paper, I discuss race, color and economic growth in
Brazil. In Part II, I examine policy considerations for legal responses to
ethnic fragmentation in Brazil, and in Part III, I offer my conclusions.
I. RACE, COLOR, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL
No other country in Latin America presents a more complex relation-
ship between race/color and economic development than Brazil, which has
attracted the attention of many scholars due to its unique history of cultural
and racial migration to the country. Centuries of miscegenation among the
races has created a society in which racial distinctions are made on the
basis of color and not race, essentially blurring racial boundaries. Accord-
ing to Brazilian census figures, 54% of the population is white, 40% brown,
5.4% black, and 0.6% native Indians and Asians. 7 However, if one classi-
fies "black" as people of African descent, then roughly 45% of the popula-
tion is black. As stated earlier, Brazil has one of the highest income
inequality and poverty rates in the world and its poverty rates are highly
correlated with race/color. 8 Measuring diversity in Brazil on the basis of its
ELF value of 0.06 would suggest that the country is ethnically homoge-
nous. 9 Indeed, such a low ELF value could reinforce the myth of a racial
democracy and conceal the marked socioeconomic inequalities among
population groups and regions. More importantly, if language is employed
as the sole basis for ethnic differentiation, public policy responses to re-
dress these problems would be ineffective. However, neither the socioeco-
6. For a presentation of the Gini coefficient-a measure of income inequality-for Brazil based
on individuals employed ten years and more by region from 1989-1999, see Tade 0. Okediji, The
Dynamics of Race, Ethnicity and Economic Development: The Brazilian Experience, 33 J. Socio-
ECON. 201, 212 tbl.8 (2004).
7. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATiSTICA [IBGE], PEQUISA NACIONAL POR
AMOSTRA DE DOMICILOS 2001 [National Household Survey for 2001] tbl.1.2b (2001) (Braz.) available
at http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad200 /sintese200l .pdf.
8. This conclusion is well established in economics literature. For a recent discussion, see Carlos
Gradin, Why Is Poverty So High Among Afro-Brazilians? A Decomposition Analysis of the Racial
Poverty Gap 16-17 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 2809,
2007), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp2809.pdf.
9. The relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth has only gained much
scholarly attention in the last decade or so. Since then, a number of studies have questioned the validity
of ELF as a robust measure of ethnic fragmentation. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschau-
wer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, Fractionalization, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 155,
158-59 (2003); Collier, supra note I; Easterly & Levine, supra note 1; Daniel N. Posner, Measuring
Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 849, 850-51 (2004).
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nomic discrepancies among race/color groups, nor the uneven patterns of
economic growth of the regions in the country support the notion of a racial
democracy. Additionally, this exposes the inherent bias of ELF, that is, the
sole reliance on language as the basis for ethnic differentiation. Therefore,
ELF would be heavily biased against countries in which language is the
basis for ethnic differentiation. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, an
endemic feature of ethnic differentiation is language, which would yield
high ELF values; in South and Central America, ethnic differentiation
manifests along racial lines and not language, thus yielding low ELF val-
ues. Thus, an ELF value would provide an inaccurate depiction of ethnic
fragmentation. The SDI, on the other hand, provides a better measure of the
nature of fragmentation in Brazil. It provides more insight into the "charac-
ter" of diversity and will be valuable for proscribing appropriate policy
responses to ameliorate these inequalities. The SDI value for Brazil is
0.6571.
There are two macro-dimensions of inequality that SDI exposes in
Brazil. First, it exposes the inequality in the pattern of economic growth
among the regions of the country. Second, it exposes the striking socioeco-
nomic inequalities among race/color groups that continue to prevail in Bra-
zilian society. Although I will discuss them separately, both dimensions of
inequality are related, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent discussion.
With respect to the unequal patterns of economic growth among the re-
gions, this can be traced to the geography of ethnic/racial and cultural mi-
gration of the groups to Brazil, which ultimately influenced the level of
industrialization and urbanization. 10 Specifically, post-sixteenth century,
European migration to Brazil (by Germans, Italians, and Poles) was to the
South, due to large deposits of gold and diamonds in places like Minas
Gerais and Matto Grosso, as well as the presence of rich agricultural and
pastoral land.'1 Japanese migration was to the South and Southeast, mainly
to Sdo Paulo. African migration via the trans-Atlantic slave trade was di-
rected to the rubber plantations in the Northeast, and the indigenous peo-
ples resided in the Amazon. Subsequently, the South and Southeast became
thriving agricultural and industrial centers, while the North and the North-
east lagged in economic growth. In spite of centuries of miscegenation, this
pattern of migration has left a lasting racial imprint on Brazilian society
10. See E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 3-7 (3d ed. 1993); CARLOS ALFREDO
HASENBALG, DISCRIMINACAO E DESIGUALDADES RACIAIS NO BRASIL [DISCRIMINATION AND
INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL] (Patrick Burglin trans., 1979); THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, BRAZIL: FIVE
CENTURIES OF CHANGE 19-25 (1999); THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD
VIEW 82-90, 156-59 (1996).
11. BURNS, supra note 10, at 5, 48; SOWELL, supra note 10.
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(see Tables 1 and 2). For instance, a majority of the white population re-
sides in the South and the Southeast, while a majority of the black popula-
tion resides in the North and Northeast. The brown or mulatto population
also resides in the North and the Northeast. The Southwest region is con-
sidered a transition zone that integrates the African North and the European
South, and is also the industrial heartland of Brazil.
The second dimension of inequality exposed by the SDI among
race/color groups is more insidious. Levels of per capita income and levels
of poverty in Brazil are highly correlated with race/color groups, in which
Afro-Brazilians are twice as poor as whites, and are in fact at the bottom of
the socioeconomic pyramid at all levels (education, residential status, ac-
cess to healthcare, and public and private sector employment). 12 The dis-
crepancies in income and labor market bias can be traced to education. As
discussed earlier, the South and the Southeast are the most developed re-
gions in Brazil. The federal universities, which are the most prestigious
institutions of higher education in Brazil, and in which entry is very com-
petitive, are disproportionately located in these regions. 13 Furthermore,
nonwhites are a minority in these regions, and their rate of entrance into
these institutions is quite low. A number of reasons account for this. One
such reason is that most of the public primary/elementary and secondary
schools in Brazil are weak, and students who graduate from public secon-
dary schools are inadequately prepared to successfully pursue a university
education. A disproportionate number of children from poorer households
(mostly nonwhites) attend these schools, while children from more affluent
households attend private primary and secondary schools, which gives
them a better opportunity to successfully pursue a university education.
Consequently, students from the highest socioeconomic background
(mostly whites) are able to attend the federal universities. 14 Private univer-
sities, although not as competitive as federal universities, are quite expen-
sive, which again constrains the ability of nonwhites to attend, since they
are unable to afford the private universities due to low income levels.
These disparities in education have been attributed to the unequal dis-
tribution of income that continues to prevail in Brazil. Earnings potential is
highly correlated with educational attainment, and as long as the labor mar-
ket discriminates on the basis of educational attainment, it ultimately cre-
ates a racial bias in the labor market. For as long as access to education is
12. See Gradin, supra note 8, at 4.
13. See Edward E. Telles, Industrialization and Racial Inequality in Employment: The Brazilian
Example, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 46,49 (1994).
14. See Jean-Jacques Paul & Laurence Wolff, The Economics of Higher Education, in
OPPORTUNITY FOREGONE: EDUCATION IN BRAZIL 523 (Nancy Birdsall & Richard H. Sabot eds., 1996).
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limited, educational inequalities will persist and continue to reinforce the
income gap between whites and nonwhites. Thus, the education variable
captures the insidious nature of racism in Brazil. As a social variable, racial
status reveals that being nonwhite implies lower earnings potential as com-
pared to whites in all employment or income categories.15 It has been sug-
gested that industrialization may have reinforced the income inequality via
socioeconomic variables such as education, location of industries and oc-
cupational structure. 16 Although Brazil has not experienced "incessant"
racial conflict when compared to other fragmented multiethnic societies, it
does not necessarily imply that the society is not susceptible to ethnic or
social tensions, especially if there are no policy initiatives to ameliorate
these problems. In fact, in recent years crime rates have increased signifi-
cantly due to high incidence of poverty and social exclusion. 17
15. See Edward E. Telles, Urban Labor Market Segmentation and Income in Brazil, 41 ECON.
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 231, 240 (1993); Okediji, supra note 6.
16. See Herbert Blumer, Industrialisation and Race Relations, in INDUSTRIALISATION AND RACE
RELATIONS 220-21 . 239-50 (Guy Hunter ed.. Greenwood Press 1985) (1965).
17. Urban Crime and Violence: Combating Citizens' Sense of Insecurity, THINKING BRAZIL NO.
21 (Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars, Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at 4-5, http://www.wilson
center.org/topics/pubs/ThinkingBrazil-21 .pdf.
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION BY COLOR/RACIAL
GROUPS, BY REGION IN BRAZIL, 199918
Region Color group
















































II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGAL RESPONSES TO
FRAGMENTATION IN BRAZIL
Despite the significant marked socioeconomic inequalities among
race/color groups, it was not until the 1990s that the government of Brazil
began to admit that racial discrimination did indeed exist in the country.
This became a focal point in the public discourse on race, which followed
on the heels of the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South
Africa in 2001. The legal tradition with respect to race in Brazil is quite
unique. Slavery was abolished in 1888, roughly 300 years after the country
was colonized by the Portuguese. Subsequent to this, laws pertaining to
race were based on constitutional provisions of 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967,
1969, and 1988 that explicitly guaranteed equal protection of all citizens
regardless of race, color, sex, and age, and mandated that racial prejudice
be punished by law.20 Unlike the United States, which instituted race-based
laws that legally mandated segregation and favored discrimination, Brazil
did not have the same legal precedent. Thus, legal remedies designed to
mobilize against such domination were unwarranted. 21 In fact, as already
stated, miscegenation was promoted in an attempt to alter the racial compo-
sition of Brazil and "whiten" the country, especially since the Portuguese
imported more Africans than the number of Indians they found in the col-
ony.
22
However, extreme socioeconomic inequalities on the basis of
race/color have forced Brazil to confront the issue of race and propose
remedies to correct the discrepancies. 23 To date, the most controversial
policy designed to reduce racial inequality has been the national affirmative
action legislation based on hiring quotas for blacks, women, and handi-
capped people, instituted in September of 2001.24 Unsurprisingly, the af-
20. See H6dio Silva, Jr., Do racismo legal ao principo da aqdo afirmativa: a lei como obstdculo e
como instrumento dos direitos e interesses do povo negro [From Racism to the Legal Principle of
Affirmative Action: The Law as a Barrier and as a Tool for the Rights and Interests of Black People], in
TRIANDO A MASCARA: ENASAIOS SOBRE 0 RACISMO NO BRASIL 359 (Antonio S6rgio Alfredo Gui-
marles & Lynn Huntley eds., 2000).
21. See ANTHONY W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND BRAZIL 22-25 (1998).
22. BURNS, supra note 10, at 3-4.
23. See HASENBALG, supra note 10; DESIGUALDADE RACIAL NO BRASIL CONTEMPORANEO
[RACIAL INEQUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL] (Peggy A. Lovell ed., 1991); NELSON DO VALLE
SILVA & CARLOS A. HASENBALG, RELA4 OES RACIAIS NO BRASIL CONTEMPORANEO [RACE
RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL] (1992).
24. This initiative started during the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso after
1995, when through a decree he established an "Interministerial Working Group to Valorize the Black
Population" (GTI) and made a public declaration recognizing the existence of racial discrimination and
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firmative action legislation has been embroiled in a shroud of controversy
from a number of quarters.25 However, in spite of the criticisms and con-
troversy surrounding affirmative action, it has certainly forced Brazilians to
confront the issue of racism in contemporary society. This being said, the
affirmative action program presents critical issues to be considered. For
instance, it is a race-based legislation; however, Brazilians are more preoc-
cupied with classifications on the basis of color rather than race. Conse-
quently, such legislation can present significant long-term implications. For
instance, it can potentially alter race consciousness in future generations
from a color continuum to a bipolar classification such as "white" or
"black," and it can also alter social dynamics in future generations. Another
perspective on the affirmative action program relates to higher education.
As indicated earlier, one of the major causes of inequality in educational
attainment between blacks and whites is income and low-quality public
primary/elementary education. Rectifying this discrepancy apart from the
quota system would require government policies aimed at investing in pub-
lic primary/elementary education in order to improve standards and the
opportunity for students to compete for entrance into public universities.
Correcting the problem at the tertiary level must start at the elementary and
secondary levels, especially since private primary/elementary schools are
not affordable for most blacks who are disproportionately represented in
the low income category.
Overall, it is an understatement that the affirmative action legislation
has forced a heated debate in the public sphere on racism, racial inequality
the need to implement policies to eliminate it. See Mala Htum, From "Racial Democracy " to Affirma-
tive Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil, 39 LATIN AM. REs. REv. 60, 67 (2004); Sergio da
Silva Martins, Carlos Alberto Medeiros & Elisa Larkin Nascimento, Paving Paradise: The Road from
"Racial Democracy" to Affirmative Action in Brazil, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 787, 797 (2004). In 2001, the
Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development announced an affirmative action program for race and
ethnicity by instituting a minimum quota of 20% for blacks in jobs within the Ministry, and a quota of
30% by 2003 in firms seeking contracts from the Ministry. In similar fashion, the Ministry of Justice
instituted quotas of 20% for blacks, 20% for women, and 5% for handicapped people in management
levels, as well as in firms offering services to the Ministry of Justice. See Htum, supra, at 68. Subse-
quently, in 2002, the Foreign Ministry instituted its own affirmative action program by subsidizing the
admission of twenty black students to the Rio Branco Institute in order to increase the number of blacks
in the diplomatic corps. See id. at 69; Martins, Meideiros & Nascimento, supra. Finally, in 2002, Presi-
dent Cardoso issued a decree creating a National Affirmative Action Program at the Federal level in
Brazil. Decree No. 4228, May 13, 2002, [XCI] Dif.rio Oficial da Uniao [D.O.U.] 6 (Braz.), available at
http://www.trt02.gov.br/geral/tribunal2/Legis/Decreto/4228_02.html. Its goals included proposing how
government agencies could institute certain percentage targets in hiring Afro-Brazilians, women, and
handicapped persons. It also extended to the education system and in particular, federal and private
universities, by establishing a 20% quota for blacks.
25. Issues pertaining to the legality of quotas as a means to correct racial inequality as well as
reverse discrimination have been raised by several scholars. See, e.g., Htum, supra note 24, at 73-75.
The affirmative action legislation has also raised the question of who is "black" and how this racial
category is determined. See SKIDMORE, supra note 10, at 208-10.
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and other socioeconomic inequalities in Brazil. However, the benefit of this
public debate will be to ultimately initiate policies that will address the
broad socioeconomic discrepancies in Brazilian society.
CONCLUSION
One of the most crucial aspects of economic development is human
development. For economic development to truly live up to its meaning in
Brazil and Latin America as a whole, issues pertaining to racial equality,
income inequality, and social justice must be addressed. One of the pur-
poses of deriving the SDI was to unpack the multifarious nature of ethnic
diversity and to move beyond the linguistic-based measure found in the
ELF Index in an attempt to expose its inherent bias as well as its limited
utility for crafting public policy. Understanding the nature of ethnic diver-
sity is relevant for the development of appropriate and robust legal reme-
dies and other government policies designed to redress socioeconomic
inequalities based on race/color. This is especially relevant for Brazil,
which has experienced such a unique racial history and in which racial
boundaries, though they exist, tend to blur due to centuries of miscegena-
tion, and which at the same time exhibits significant racial inequalities. To
this end, the affirmative action legislation in Brazil represents a good first
step in recognizing the existence of racial inequalities and social exclusion,
and will certainly serve to promote legal and public policy mechanisms to
ameliorate pervasive socioeconomic inequalities in Brazilian society. At a
broader level, the Brazilian initiative may serve as a pioneering example
for other Latin American countries on implementing public policies to
combat racial discrimination.
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27. Okediji, supra note 4.
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Region ELF
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA cont.
Sierra-Leone .9380
Angola .9148
Mali .9108
Niger .9003
Namibia .8753
Senegal .8730
Mauritania .8724
Guinea .8714
Gambia .8550
Lesotho .8453
Swaziland .8076
Djibouti .7879
Rwanda .7513
Namibia .8753
Burundi .7475
Somalia .4511
NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE-EAST
Qatar .9943
Israel .9527
Kuwait .9007
Bahrain .8468
Iran .8351
Iraq .8276
Oman .7970
Lebanon .7941
Morocco .7932
Jordan .7840
Turkey .6963
Algeria .6450
Yemen .6276
Palestine .6061
Syria .5421
Tunisia .5200
Egypt .4707
Saudi Arabia .4457
Region E
WESTERN EUROPE/NORTH
AMERICA
LF
.9895
.9621
.9403
.9396
.8615
.8582
.8541
.8464
.7620
.7435
.6750
.6253
.6127
.5768
.5558
.5163
.4505
.3517
.3176
.2999
.2977
.2807
.2771
.2045
Canada
USA
New Zealand
Australia
Switzerland
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Spain
Italy
Sweden
Ireland
Luxembourg
Austria
Norway
Netherlands
Cyprus
Finland
Greece
Denmark
Iceland
Portugal
Malta
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